How did we get here and when will it end? A year of Red Sea shipping diversions

By Santiago José del Castillo – Naval Liaison at ESS Maritime

The Bab El Mandeb Strait, also known as the Gate of Lamentations, has been the weeping witness of many dark events throughout history, such as the Pirate Round, the Red Sea slave trade, the Royal Navy and Regia Marina naval engagements during the Second World War, and the Yemen Civil War that began in 2014.

Since the 19^th of November of 2023, this strategical strait has become one of the main scenarios of a crisis that, unfortunately, is lasting longer than expected: the Ansarallah – commonly known as the Houthis, attacks on the international merchant fleet and the corresponding Red Sea diversions. This event has shaped the international maritime trade and has become a crucible of war for merchant and naval sailors, forced to face risks never seen since the end of the Second World War.

As we are closing to the one-anniversary mark of the beginning of this crisis, a retrospective analysis of what has happened so far becomes fundamental to understanding the two main questions that comprise the title of this article: “How did we get here?” and, “when will it end?” A year ago, the threat that the Houthis posed to the merchant ships transiting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden was considered moderate, but never conditional to any kind of operational decisions taken by the Shipping Industry. However, in a matter of months, the Houthis have proved to be a challenging adversary, to the point that the current trade volume of the aforementioned areas is directly conditioned by their actions.

From a personal perspective, writing about the Red Sea Crisis and its impact on the maritime trade allows me to briefly leave the operational perspective I have been working from for the last two years and analyze the challenge from an academic perspective. I kindly appreciate the opportunity that German Student/Young Pugwash has given me, taking me out of my comfort zone to inaugurate the Blue Depths Maritime Blog with this article.

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How did we get here?

The terrorist attacks of Hamas on Israel on October 6^th, 2023, and the corresponding operation launched by the Israeli Armed Forces over the Gaza Strip, are considered the origin of this crisis. The breakthrough of Israeli forces in Gaza triggered the Houthi campaign in support of the Palestinian people, which began with the launch of several missiles and drones to attack maritime merchant trade vessels that would be related in any way to Israel. This would include not only destination, flag, or company, but any aspect related to the vessel such as ownership, operator, cargo, insurance, charterer, etc.

On November 19^th, 2023, the Bahamas-flagged car carrier GALAXY LEADER (IMO 9237307) was assaulted by a boarding team of Houthi rebels, which approached the vessel with a helicopter that dropped the operatives on the deck of the car carrier. The vessel’s crew was quickly overpowered by the perpetrators, who took control of the ship and headed to Al Hudaydah (Yemen). The reason behind this kidnap? GALAXY LEADER is operated by the Japanese Company Nippon Yusen (NYK) but was owned by Galaxy Maritime Ltd. which at the same time is owned by Ray Car Carriers, Ltd., co-owned by the Israeli businessman Abraham Ungar.

As of today, GALAXY LEADER’s crew are still held hostage on board the vessel in the vicinity of Al Hudaydah, despite the release demands from family members, maritime groups, and the International Maritime Organization, among other actors.

The hijack of the GALAXY LEADER marked the beginning of a series of attacks that sprawled over time until last 28^th of October, 2024, when the last vessel – MV MOTARO (IMO 9310290) was attacked up to three times by missiles while transiting the Southern Red Sea, which exploded in the vicinity of the vessel. The total number of incidents, as indicated by reference military authorities such as the Joint Maritime Information Centre, ascends to 105, with a toll of two injured mariners, four innocent casualties, and at least two merchant vessels sunk: MV RUBYMAR and MV TUTOR. Furthermore, this crisis has developed serious psychological consequences for the innocent mariners sailing onboard these vessels, resulting in crews refusing to transit the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, or national restrictions for sailors to sail these areas, such as the one carried out by The Philippines. 

The impact of the Houthi campaign against merchant shipping can be seen since the end of 2023; by January 2024, more than 15 shipping companies had announced that they were suspending any kind of transit through the Red Sea due to safety concerns (s). On a general basis, approximately 12% of global trade passes through the Red Sea, making it one of the world's most pivotal maritime straits. The diversions caused by these attacks triggered a diversion of container ships by up to 60% as of June 2024; these diversions caused an initial shock to many shipping companies, which were forced to adapt their services to sail around the Cape of Good Hope, the traditional – and longer, trading route before the creation of the Suez Canal. Thus, longer transits mean longer costs, which are paid by the consumer onshore. Nonetheless, today these diversions are now considered “the new normal situation” for the shipping industry, which even sought certain opportunities such as the expansion of their fleets to face an increasing demand for services due to the disruptions.

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Since the hijack of the GALAXY LEADER, the international community followed with concern the development of the events. In the vein of the continuous attacks against merchant vessels, on the 19^th of December the United States announced the creation of a multinational mission to protect the maritime trade from the Houthis’ attacks; Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG) was the first military initiative that took place in the Area of Operations, under the umbrella of Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and the leadership of Combined Task Force 153, focused on the security in the Red Sea.

On the 11^th of January 11, 2023, the United States and the United Kingdom initiated a series of attacks on Houthi-controlled areas, which would mark the beginning of Operation Poseidon Archer (OPA), an offensive operation not related to OPG that would aim to diminish the Houthi capabilities to strike merchant vessels.

Finally, on the 19^th of February, 2024, the European Union announced the launch of EUNAVFOR Operation ASPIDES, with Greek leadership and a strictly defensive mandate, with the objective of providing protection to merchant vessels transiting the Red Sea.

How reliable are these operations, however? While they are indeed providing a remarkable service by protecting numerous merchant vessels every day, it is not possible to ensure the safety of all the merchant fleet transiting the area. The limited number of assets and personnel deployed in these operations, which has been continuously highlighted by military authorities, does not contribute towards this endeavor either.

The latest insight from the Area of Operations came by the time this article was being finalized, as the German Ministry of Defense had stated that the German Frigate FGS Baden-Württemberg and the Support Ship FGS Frankfurt am Main would avoid the Red Sea on their way back to Germany from their deployment at the Indo-Pacific. Experts in Maritime Security like Dimitris Maniatis, CEO of MARISKS, argue that this decision had been made following precautionary security concerns and taking into consideration the limited long-range capabilities of the naval vessels, as these units are not equipped to engage the threats that characterize the Red Sea at the moment. This decision, however, has a very important impact from the information perspective: in particular, as these warships were returning from a “freedom of navigation” deployment at the South China Sea.

Is this “new normal situation” here to stay? Can we expect a potential end of the Houthi operations against merchant shipping in the foreseeable future? 

Targeting array and information warfare, the main challenges of the Houthi Threat

It is important to remember that, in 2014 the Houthi rebels seized the power of Sanna (Yemen), triggering the Yemen Civil War that spans until today. However, their relevance never reached a relevance higher than the regional spectrum. However, the attacks on international shipping took the Houthis, their objectives, and their capabilities to the headlines of newspapers all over the world.

The Houthi campaign against merchant trade in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden started by targeting vessels that were, in a way, directly affiliated with Israel in any way. This was the case of the GALAXY LEADER and the following attacks that took place in November and December of 2023. The objective of these attacks was to pressure Israel to stop their offensive in the Gaza Strip, declare a ceasefire, and ensure the safe arrival of humanitarian aid to the area. Another highlighted case is the one of the MAERSK HANGZHOU (IMO 9784300), which was fired upon by four Houthi crafts on the 23^rd of December. The vessel issued a distress signal that was answered by helicopters from nearby US Navy vessels in the area. When the helicopters arrived at the scene, they were also fired upon, causing them to fire back in self-defense, sinking three of the four Houthi crafts and killing ten of the attackers. This is considered the last boarding attempt perpetrated by the Houthis, shifting to other methods of attacking vessels such as the use of missiles, unmanned aerial systems, or unmanned surface systems.

After the US and UK attacks on Houthi capabilities in January 2024, the targeting array of the Houthis was considerably expanded, including any vessel that would have perceived affiliation with the United States or the United Kingdom. Other nations, participating in Operation Prosperity Guardian, have been also the subject of targeting, despite the defensive nature of OPG. This showcases the little differentiation in terms of targeting between nations belonging to OPG and OPA, respectively: targeting conditions that are maintained until today and that have forced numerous shipping companies to divert their transits around the Cape of Good Hope and even forbid the usage of armed guards onboard to prevent potential escalation, as it is the case of The Netherlands. This forced the remaining carriers to either be protected by military forces while transiting the area – which would lead, in many cases, to a long waiting list before being escorted, or to sail on their own with the risk of being attacked. Background checks and affiliation checks became the daily life of Company Security Officers and other Maritime Security Providers, to ensure the minimal risk possible.

As a result, the insurance coverage costs for vessels transiting the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden soared in a matter of months. While some Insurers and P&I Clubs still offer War Coverage – and Excess War Risks P&I Coverage, in the case of P&I Clubs, to vessels transiting these areas, other entities have decided to stop their coverage in the area, forcing vessels to divert around the Cape of Good Hope.

On the other hand, Chinese shipping companies, due to the country's good relationship with Iran, continue to enjoy relatively safe passage through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, under the close surveillance of the Chinese Navy and private Chinese contractors. These companies are filling the gap left by those companies that are diverting around the Cape of Good Hope, hence embarking on high-risk, high-reward transits, and capitalizing on the situation.

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The main problem of this dynamic scenario is that, from an attacker's perspective, if you force all your potential targets to avoid your targeting, you end up running out of targets. When this happens, you either stop attacking or find an excuse to continue doing so. On the 16^th of May, 2024, days after Israel launched its offensive in Rafah, the Houthis announced that the target list would now include any company that has made a port call to Israel. This meant that if a company had ships that had called on Israeli ports in the recent past, the whole company fleet would be targeted, no matter the current port destination or origin of the vessel. The first notable victim of this change of targeting was the MV TUTOR (IMO 9942627), which was struck by an Unmanned Surface Vessel (USV) and other systems, killing one innocent mariner, and eventually causing the ship to sink.

Another serious example of these attacks was the MT SOUNION (IMO 9312145), a crude oil tanker with 150,000 tons of crude oil that was transiting the Red Sea in August 2024. She was struck by a USV that disabled the vessel, causing the crew to abandon ship and raising serious environmental concerns regarding the potential spillage of oil in the region. After almost two weeks stranded in the middle of the sea, the SOUNION was successfully towed to safety, where operations to secure both vessel and cargo are still ongoing.

The attacks on the MV TUTOR and MT SOUNION, respectively, as well as the limited reaction time from the military authorities, provided the Houthis with golden opportunities to create propaganda material that would be later showcased internationally, causing great distress among the shipping community. These communications, due to their nature, are capable of causing major disruptions in the merchant flow, supporting the Houthi “blockade” in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

According to relevant military authorities, there are two types of associations that the Houthis are currently executing in their targeting operations:

• Direct Association: The targeted vessel has made a recent port call to Israel; owner, operator, charterer, manager, or flag state is Israeli, UK, or US.

• No Direct Association: Other vessels within the company structure have made one or more recent port calls in Israel.

Furthermore, the Houthis can employ a variety of means to identify, confirm, and target vessels of interest: AIS transmission, LRIT & Third Parties information, overhead surveillance, and reports from sympathetic vessels or spotters are some of these systems.

One of the main problems of this targeting campaign is the broadly available information existing online, which has helped the Houthis in designating their targeting system and including a certain number of companies in their sights. As a shipowner, the joy and pride of your company are, indeed, your vessels; for this reason, when you enter a shipping company webpage, you are able to see lists of all the vessels that the company manages, including IMO and MMSI numbers, flag state, and other details that can be used to easily identify the corresponding ships that would later on become a target of the Houthis. While some companies removed this information from their websites after the attacks started, it was already too late. Furthermore, there are numerous third-party platforms that, with the purchase of a subscription, you can access not only this aforementioned information but also the history of changes that ships have done in terms of ownership, insurer, registration, etc.

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As of today, according to military authorities, there are fewer targeting opportunities because many vessels are transiting via the Cape of Good Hope or no longer transiting the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden. Assessments expect that the Houthis will continue developing their association targeting to continue attacking innocent shipping. Despite the actions of EUNAVFOR ASPIDES, Prosperity Guardian, and Poseidon Archer to protect the merchant trade in the area, the Houthis have successfully proven for almost a year that they can substantially disrupt the maritime traffic in one of the most important maritime chokepoints of the world.

For the Houthis, this information warfare at a strategic level is paramount, proof of it being the continuous press releases, social media posts, and even propaganda products they release every time a new attack takes place. Brigadier General Yahya Qasim Sare'e, military spokesman of the Houthis, has become internationally recognized for his X (former Twitter) posts and his statements regarding the development of the operation, which enhances the effect that the Houthi operations have over the international shipping industry.

There is a reason behind this strategic communication: it is a way for the Houthis not only to reinforce their position as the "legitimate" government of the Republic of Yemen but also as a relevant regional actor with both diplomatic and military capabilities. Furthermore, it supports their operational efforts by strongly influencing the Shipping Industry; not only those companies whose vessels are targeted but those who have no association.

However, these communications and statements carried out by the Houthis are not always true. The latest example of this is the statement issued by the Yemeni Armed Forces (Houthis) on the 28^th of November, 2024, in which they announced that they have targeted up to three vessels: MAERSK KOWLOON and SC MONTREAL in the Arabian Sea, and MV MOTARO – previously mentioned at the beginning of this article, in the Red Sea and Bab al Mandeb Strait. Out of all these three attacks, only the MV MOTARO was attacked; this was proven by military authorities such as the MICA Center. It is fundamental to confront the Houthis not only at sea but also in the Information domain, as this field can greatly influence future developments in the area.

Conclusion

While the Houthis have claimed that they will stop their attacks once there is a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, there are no guarantees that this would take place even if a ceasefire is agreed upon. If Israel accepted the Houthis' demands and declared a ceasefire, it would prove to the Houthis that their strategy is efficient, and it is most likely that they would continue their attacks against merchant vessels under another justification. For this reason, it is possible to affirm that there are too many different elements that will condition the outcome of this crisis. One year into this scenario, the only thing that we can continue asking ourselves is "When?" The cooperation between public and private sectors, as well as intense diplomatic, military, and information efforts, will be crucial to secure a victory in a crisis that has already claimed enough innocent victims but has also shaped the maritime trade as we knew it a year ago.